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Consistent financial reward of particular features influences the allocation of visual
attention in many ways. More surprising are 1-trial reward priming effects on attention
where reward schedules are random and reward on one trial influences attentional
allocation on the next. Those findings are thought to reflect that rewarded features
become more salient than unrewarded ones on the subsequent trial. Here we attempt
to conceptually replicate this effect, testing its generalizability. In three versions of an
analogous paradigm to the additional singleton paradigm involving singleton search for a
Gabor patch of odd spatial frequency we found no evidence of reward priming, while we
only partially replicate the reward priming in the exact original paradigm tested by Hickey
and colleagues. The results cast doubt on the proposal that random reward enhances
salience, suggested in the original papers, and highlight the need for a more nuanced
account. In many other paradigms reward effects have been found to progress gradually,
becoming stronger as they build up, and we argue that for robust reward priming, reward
schedules need to be more consistent than in the original 1-trial reward priming paradigm.
Keywords: reward, visual attention, visual search, capture, repetition priming, visual selection, feature priming
INTRODUCTION
Reward, financial or through the possibility of lessened effort,
has a strong effect upon attentional function. Della-Libera and
Chelazzi (2009) showed that selection or ignoring of stimuli is
strongly modulated by whether stimuli are consistently associ-
ated with high or low reward. Anderson et al. (2011) found that
stimuli associated with high reward are more likely to capture
attention on subsequent unrewarded trials and in Kristjánsson
et al. (2010) priming of pop-out was stronger for highly rewarded
colors than colors receiving low reward. Kristjánsson et al. also
showed that observers were flexible, quickly picking up onwithin-
block changes in reward schedules even without awareness of the
changes. Kiss et al. (2009) have shown how the N2pc attentional
selection EEG component occurs earlier and is larger for visual
search for colors consistently rewarded higher than for colors
receiving low reward. Observer-by-observer N2pc correlated with
effects of reward on search efficiency. Tseng and Lleras (2013)
have then shown how rewarded search contexts are more eas-
ily learned during implicit contextual cueing (see Chelazzi et al.,
2013 for review).
In most of these studies, reward was consistently associ-
ated with a particular color or context during a training phase,
throughout testing, or at least for long series of adjacent tri-
als. In contrast, Hickey et al. (2010a,b, 2011) reported an effect
they called reward priming, in a task in which correct responses
were rewarded with randomly determined high or low mone-
tary reward. Their key finding was that a correct response to a
target, which coincidentally resulted in high-reward, led to less
attentional capture by an irrelevant singleton distractor on a
subsequent trial when the color scheme of targets and distractors
remained constant. If the colors changed between trials, on the
other hand, performance was slowed. In one of their studies
(Hickey et al., 2010b), low-magnitude rewards even led to an
apparent devaluation of target features and attention was applied
more slowly to these features. Participants responded slowly when
the target was the same as on the preceding trial, but quickly when
the colors swapped following low-magnitude rewards. Hickey
et al. argued that rewards could have an inhibitory effect if target
color differed from the last trial.
Hickey et al. termed this “reward priming”—the high reward
biases selective processes toward a transiently valued stimulus
feature, and can lead to inhibited responses if that feature is
currently present on a distractor, analogously to priming of
visual search (see e.g., Olivers and Humphreys, 2003; Muller
et al., 2004; Theeuwes et al., 2006; Kristjánsson et al., 2008;
Lamy et al., 2010; Ásgeirsson et al., 2014; see, e.g., Kristjánsson
and Campana, 2010; Lamy and Kristjánsson, 2013, for review).
What distinguishes this result from many other studies in the
literature on reward and attention is that there was no con-
tingency between target and distractor color on the one hand,
and actual reward on the other. Hickey et al. seemingly iso-
lated a direct effect of reward reception that was independent
of longer-term, or motivational factors. In other words, this
suggested 1-trial effects from rewarded attention deployments.
Note that their effect was dependent upon the presence of an
irrelevant color singleton, suggesting that the reward affects
selection rather than other processes. Selection is, typically,
much more difficult when a highly salient singleton distractor
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is presented alongside a less salient target stimulus (Jonides and
Yantis, 1988; Theeuwes, 1992; Franconeri et al., 2005). That
reward priming affects efficiency of selection is further supported
by electrophysiological evidence. High rewards affect the N2pc
ERP component differentially; depending on whether the color
scheme of a display repeats or the colors swap (Hickey et al.,
2010b).
Hickey et al. proposed that this reflected a general transient
effect of reward associated with a particular target color that
boosts target saliency. Throughout their experiments, they always
used the same stimulus set, with set-size, color, and target identity
manipulations; never manipulating salience directly or generaliz-
ing the effects to other stimulus sets [but see Hickey and van Zoest
(2012) for related findings with eye-movement measures]. Here
we conduct a conceptual replication of their experiments to gen-
eralize their findings to other stimulus sets (Experiments 1 and 2).
Another point that merits attention is that the main depen-
dent variable in the tasks of Hickey et al. is response time. Since
reward did not depend on response speed but only on whether
the response was correct or not, this means that the most lucra-
tive strategy was not to respond as quickly as possible, but rather
to respond correctly. The main dependent measure is, in other
words, not rewarded. A second motivation here was therefore to
investigate the role of strategy, by adding motivation for speed
(Experiment 3), where observers were told that they had 45min to
maximize their earnings. The faster they responded the more tri-
als were presented so that their chances to earn money increased.
Finally, in experiment 4 we attempt to replicate the Hickey et al.
result using their original task.
EXPERIMENT 1—CONCEPTUAL REPLICATION OF HICKEY
ET AL. (2010a)
The first experiment was designed to conceptually replicate the
results of Hickey et al. (2010a) testing a task similar to the one
used in their experiments, while changing the stimuli in the
hope of generalizing the results beyond their exact paradigm. If
reward priming reflects increased salience of recently rewarded
features, the effect should be replicable in any paradigm where
there is sufficient selection pressure, and the random feature
(e.g., color) is sufficiently salient. We therefore expected to find
results consistent with 1-trial reward priming in our conceptu-
ally identical paradigm. From the Hickey et al. (2010a) result we
expected observers to respond faster to a target whose color is
repeated from the previous trial if it also resulted in a high reward.
However, if the target changes color between trials and observers
have previously received high reward, they should respond more
slowly to the current target. Such a divergence in results would
constitute reward priming following high, but not low reward
but no color-association effects following low reward trials
(Figure 1A). But based on Hickey et al. (2010b, 2011) we might
also expect the opposite pattern to the high reward pattern for tri-
als following low reward—that observers will respond slowly to
targets sharing color with a previous target. Conversely, observers
should be faster when a target changes color between trials, imme-
diately following reception of low reward (Figure 1B). Tentatively,
we will consider the emergence of either pattern a successful
replication.
FIGURE 1 | (A) The reward priming pattern reported in Hickey et al. (2010a),
where low reward did not affect the subsequent trial, but a high reward did
so contingent on whether color was repeated or not. (B) The reward
priming pattern reported in Hickey et al. (2010b, 2011), where both high and
low reward affected response times, contingent on color repetition, but in
the opposite ways, as if a target previously associated with high reward
was subsequently highly valued, but a target previously associated with
low reward was subsequently devalued. The figure does not represent
actual data and is only for illustrative purposes. See Hickey et al. (2010a,b,
2011) for details on their results.
METHODS
Subjects
Twenty observers participated. They were randomly assigned to
either experiment 1 or experiment 3 from a pool of 40 partic-
ipants (26 female), aged 19–30 year (mean = 23.8 year). Due
to privacy restrictions, age and gender information is not avail-
able for each experiment separately. The project was approved by
the Research Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology,
University of Copenhagen, and the IRB at the University of
Iceland.
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli.Gabor-patches of low or high spatial frequency (approx.1
and 4 cycles per degree, respectively), appeared on a dark
background (lum. = 0.2 cd/m2). The diameter of each Gabor
was 4.3◦. They were tilted ± 45◦ from vertical (see Figure 2).
The target and distractor stimuli were pinkish red (x = 0.412,
z = 0.304, lum. = 35.6 cd/m2, at maximal luminosity) or light
green (x = 0.288, z = 0.384, lum. = 32.1 cd/m2, at max. lumi-
nosity). On each trial, four Gabor patches were presented on an
imaginary circle (radius = 7.4◦), centered on a fixation cross.
Stimulus configuration varied randomly between trials such that
the distance between all 4 stimuli was always equal, but there were
12 potential stimulus positions, resulting in three different config-
urations. A target was defined as the stimulus with the odd spatial
frequency, whereas all other stimuli were of the opposing spatial
frequency.
A target, defined by odd spatial frequency, was present on all
trials. A salient singleton distractor was present on 50% of trials,
while the other half had only non-targets plus the target. We will
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refer to these as present/absent trials throughout, unless otherwise
noted. On present trials, there were always two non-targets on the
screen, alongside the target and the singleton distractor. The non-
targets always shared the color of the target, but shared spatial
frequency with the oddly colored singleton distractor. On absent
trials, there were three non-targets while all other features were
the same as on present trials.
The percentage of present vs. absent trials differed fromHickey
et al. (2010b), where a singleton distractor was present on 80%
of trials. The reasoning behind this change is that Hickey et al.
(2010a, p. 4) argued that “novelty” should disrupt search to the
greatest degree, and therefore based their analysis solely on trials
where a singleton distractor was present, but had not been present
on the previous trial1. We therefore reasoned that disruption by
novelty would increase with more absent trials. Simultaneously,
we increased the statistical power of our design, by keeping 25%
of our trials eligible for analysis (half of our trials are present trials,
and half of those will follow an absent trial), compared to 16% in
Hickey et al. (2010b; 80% of their trials were present trials, but
only 20% of those followed an absent trial).
Reward schedule. As in the studies by Hickey et al. (2010a,b,
2011), the reward schedule was not contingent on any display
parameters, but selected by a balanced randomization algorithm
for each trial (“high” reward = (5 ISK/0.3 DKK); “low” reward =
(0.5 ISK/0.03 DKK). Punishment (following errors) had only one
level, equal to the negative of “high” reward. Rewards were also
signaled by audible feedback. A high-pitched “ka-ching” sound
was played following high reward; when the reward was low, a
high note was played (C6); and when the response was incor-
rect and the observer was punished, a medium pitched note was
played (C4). Examples of these feedback noises were given before
the experiment started.
Apparatus
The experiment was carried out in two laboratories and apart
from any differences noted, methods were identical. At the
University of Iceland, the experiment was run on a 2.8GHz
Dell Optiplex 760 desktop computer connected to a 100Hz 14′
CRT display. At the University of Copenhagen, it was run on a
2.66GHz Dell Optiplex 255 connected to a 100Hz 19′ CRT dis-
play. Stimulus presentation was programmed in Matlab® using
the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Viewing
distance was adjusted so that retinal size was practically identical
in the two setups.
Design and procedure
Observers were presented with illustrated task instructions before
the experiment started. They were instructed to respond as
quickly as possible, without making many errors. The reward
scheme was explained, i.e., that when responding correctly
observers would receive high or low reward, but when they
responded incorrectly they would lose money. Following the
1For unspecified reasons, Hickey et al. (2011) apply the opposite filter, i.e.,
analyse only present trials succeeding present trials, when testing for the same
reward priming effect (p. 122).
instructions they viewed and listened to computerized exam-
ples of “dummy” trials and the audio feedback related to each
reward/punishment level, before completing 30 practice trials.
During practice trials, reward balance was displayed (but not
paid out). Observers were informed of this beforehand. Following
practice the experiment started, run as a single block of 900 tri-
als. Four observers ran only 811 trials, but were otherwise treated
identically to all other observers.
A single trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross
at screen center for 700–1300ms after which the four Gabor
patches were presented on an imaginary circle. On half of trials,
the Gabor patches were all uniformly colored, red, or green (sin-
gleton distractor absent trials). On these trials, there were always
three non-targets whose spatial frequencies were the same and
one target, defined by odd spatial frequency. On the other half
of trials, three Gabor patches, two of which were non-targets and
one a target, shared a color, while the fourth patch had the oppos-
ing color (the singleton distractor). Note, however, that stimulus
colors were completely irrelevant to the task.
Observers located the item of odd spatial frequency (the
target-defining variable) and reported whether that Gabor was
rotated −45◦ (“J” key) or + 45 (“L” key) from vertical (the
response feature). As soon as a key was pressed, the reward
amount appeared at screen center and the appropriate feedback
sound was played. The next trial started a second later with the
presentation of the fixation cross in isolation. This procedure
was interrupted every 30 trials by the presentation of the total
amount earned. After finishing the experiment, observers were
debriefed on the experimental hypothesis and informed of their
total earnings.
RESULTS
Before analyses, we applied individual filters to each observer’s
data where very slow reaction times were discarded (individual
mean + 3 std; 1.8% of trials, between-observer range: 0.2–2.6%).
As expected there were large differences between trials where
the irrelevant singleton distractor was present vs. absent [810 vs.
699ms, respectively; t(19) = 8.409, p < 0.001]. This shows that
our modified irrelevant singleton paradigm is analogous to the
one in Theeuwes (1992), in that observers have trouble ignoring
color singletons, even when always irrelevant. Observers were also
more accurate in the distractor absent condition (98.5%) com-
pared to the distractor present condition [97.2%; t(19) = −3.337,
p < 0.004].
We then filtered the dataset further to match that of Hickey
et al. (2010a, p. 4).We discarded all incorrect trials, as well as trials
preceded by incorrect trials since they were also not preceded by
reward. We also discarded singleton distractor absent trials, and
trials that were not preceded by absent trials (see also Method).
Finally, we limited analyses to trials where response/orientation
was repeated from the previous trial. The filtering process left an
average of 101 trials per participant.
Following Hickey et al. (2010a) we contrasted reaction times
where target color is constant between subsequent trials com-
pared to when it changes and, further, whether the current trial
is preceded by randomly determined high or low reward. A
repeated measures ANOVA of within-subject effects on reaction
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times revealed a marginally significant main effect of target color
repetition [F(1, 19) = 4.236, p = 0.054, η2p = 0.182] but no effect
of reward value [F(1, 19) = 1.129, p = 0.301, η2p = 0.056]. Most
importantly, there was no interaction between target color repeti-
tion and reward value [F(1, 19) = 1.612, p = 0.220, η2p = 0.078].
Figure 3A, shows no hint of the reward priming interaction
of reward and color reported in Hickey et al. (2010a). Taking
accuracy into account, by calculating inverse efficiencies (e.g.,
Townsend and Ashby, 1983) for each condition and running a
repeated measures ANOVA on those, further pushed the trend
away from the reward priming interaction.
DISCUSSION
There was no evidence of reward priming in experiment 1, or
faster responding following highly rewarded trials, when target
color was constant between trials, nor a slowing of responses fol-
lowing high reward with a swap of colors. In fact reward barely
seemed to affect performance at all. This is surprising, given that
Hickey et al. (2011) argued that the salience of the target feature is
boosted following a highly rewarded trial, and observed the effect
on three separate occasions in a paradigm analogous to ours.
Two features of the respective paradigms should be noted: (i)
Our set-size was fixed at 4. Hickey et al. demonstrated reward
priming using set-sizes of 6 and 12. Might set-size affect the
results? When target identity is unknown in visual search, slopes
of set-size vs. response time are negative, decreasing toward
an asymptote around a set-size of 10 (Bravo and Nakayama,
1992). This has been attributed to ambiguity (Meeter and Olivers,
2006); with only two non-targets and an unknown target, there
is sparse information to determine the target. However, when
a target is present among many identical non-targets, there is
ample evidence regarding which category each stimulus belongs
to. Reward priming may therefore depend on sufficiently unam-
biguous search conditions. In experiment 1, we used the smallest
possible set-size, and consequently the most ambiguous target-
distractor relationship, in an irrelevant singleton paradigm, find-
ing no reward priming.
(ii) An important feature of Hickey et al.’s paradigm is that
reward value is unrelated to reaction time. If an accurate response
is given, reward level is random. The optimal strategy tomaximize
profit is therefore to emphasize accuracy using a conservative (i.e.,
slow) response strategy. The adoption of such a strategy would
compromise the interpretation of reaction times, the primary
measure.
We address these two points in experiments 2 and 3.
EXPERIMENT 2—INCREASED SET-SIZE
May set-size explain discrepancies between our results and those
of Hickey et al.? They originally used a set-size of 12 (2010a,b) and
replicated the effect with a set-size of 6. The reward priming effect
may depend on larger set-sizes, perhaps reflecting larger pop-out
for the target and irrelevant distractor (see Bravo and Nakayama,
1992; Meeter and Olivers, 2006). We therefore re-ran experiment
1 on 19 naive observers, doubling the number of objects in each
search display.
METHODS
Nineteen observers (aged 18–38, mean 24.3 years; 15 female)
participated in this experiment and experiment 4. The order of
the experiments was counterbalanced so that 10 observers ran
experiment 4 first, followed by experiment 2, but the remain-
ing 9 in reverse order. Methods were identical to experiment
1, except for increased set-size (8). Stimuli were now pre-
sented at 8 fixed positions on an imaginary circle. The size
FIGURE 2 | (A) A trial started when a fixation-cross appeared. The stimulus
array was presented until response, followed by a feedback display signifying
the amount of reward or punishment obtained on the current trial. (B) All
possible trial types relative to the example trial type in panel (A). Each type
was equally likely and the amount of reward was not related to trial type or
any other task attribute. Note that the main hypothesis is tested by
calculating the means of trials where the irrelevant singleton was present on
the current trial, but absent on the previous (n-1) trial. The target is always
shown as a low spatial frequency singleton in the western position. Targets
could also be high spatial frequency singletons, among low-frequency ones,
and were equally likely to appear at any of the four positions. Stimuli are not
drawn to scale. See Stimuli and apparatus for stimulus specifications.
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of each Gabor-patch was reduced slightly to fit well on the
screen (from 3.71 to 3.4◦), proportionally decreasing spatial fre-
quency. Apparati were identical to experiment 1 (Copenhagen
setup).
Personality trait measures
Hickey et al. (2010a) showed that reaction time reductions
immediately following reception of high reward correlated
strongly with a subscale on the BIS/BAS Scale measuring
sensitivity to punishment and reward (Carver and White,
1994). However, the correlation did not hold for the oppo-
site negative priming effect, following low reward reception. We
administered the BIS/BAS scale to the 19 observers. Response
sheets were signed with observer numbers and returned in
closed envelopes to ensure anonymity. Results from trait mea-
sures are presented at the end of the results section for all
experiments.
RESULTS
Observers responded accurately on 98.4% of trials in experi-
ment 2 (range: 95.9–99.8). The dataset was filtered in exactly the
same way as in experiment 1, leaving an average of 106 trials
per observer. Again, there were clear differences between reac-
tion times in the present (905ms) and absent (744ms) conditions
[t(18) = 7.572, p < 0.001]. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed
a main effect of color repetition [F(1, 18) = 13.097, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.421] but no effect of reward [F(1, 18) = 1.726, p = 0.205,
η2p = 0.087]. Most importantly, there was no indication of
the reward priming interaction [F(1, 18) = 0.981, p = 0.335,
η2p = 0.052; Figure 3B].
DISCUSSION
With increased set size, to induce larger pop-out effects (Bravo
and Nakayama, 1992) there was still no evidence of feature-
specific reward priming. We can therefore rule set size out as a
potential explanation of the results of experiment 1. We are, how-
ever still left with the puzzle of not observing any reward priming,
which is clearly predicted byHickey et al, who claimed that reward
boosts the saliency of a rewarded feature on the next trial.
EXPERIMENT 3—ENCOURAGING SPEEDED RESPONDING
The main dependent measure in Hickey et al. (2010a,b, 2011) was
RT, but maximizing speed was not the optimal strategy. Monetary
gains were highest by emphasizing accuracy over speed, since
errors were punished by losses. Even if Hickey et al. found reward
priming with this procedure; this might explain the null find-
ings in our first two experiments. Subtleties in instructions may
have motivated observers to respond quickly and accurately in
their studies, while our instructions failed to do so. However,
an instruction manipulation, with constant task contingencies,
would not ensure that observers would adopt a faster, less opti-
mal, strategy. Instead, in experiment 3, we changed the task
such that, rather than each observer participating in 900 trials
exactly, observers had 45min to perform as many trials as pos-
sible. This manipulation should motivate observers to respond
quickly and accurately, and discourage conservative response
strategies.
METHODS
Twenty observers participated (see Method, Experiment 1 for
details). The results from one observer were discarded due to poor
performance (accuracy < 80%; mean RTs > 2000ms). Other
features of the design were copied directly from experiment 1,
with the exception that time, rather than trial number now lim-
ited experiment duration. Whereas experiment 1 was run for a
predefined number of trials, observers were told that they had
exactly 45min to finish as many trials as possible. Instructions
were changed to highlight this, along with encouragement that
they should try to earn as much money as they could in that time.
The BIS/BAS scale was administered before observers performed
the primary task with identities protected as in experiment 2.
RESULTS
Observers finished 925 trials during their 45min on average
(range: 791–987). As before, there were clear differences between
reaction times in the distractor-present (794ms) and distractor-
absent (703ms) conditions [t(18) = 8.333, p < 0.001]. There was
no difference in overall mean reaction time between this task
and experiment 1 [747 vs. 753ms, respectively; t(34.971) = 0.151;
p = 0.881] 2. The similarity of mean reaction time between the
two versions of the task may suggest that lack of motivation was
not a key factor in producing the null-effect in experiment 1.
We cannot rule out that the group participating in the current
experiment was slower in general (nor can we rule out the oppo-
site), since these were different observers. Further, the similarity
in overall reaction times says nothing about whether there are
effects of the limited time motivation in conditions crucial for
reward priming.
To test whether the motivationmanipulation produced reward
priming, we filtered the data in the same way as in exper-
iment 1, leaving an average of 109 trials per observer. A
repeated measures ANOVA of within-subject effects on reac-
tion times revealed no significant main effects of color rep-
etition [F(1, 18) = 0.199, p = 0.661, η2p = 0.011], reward value
[F(1, 18) = 3.136, p = 0.093, η2p = 0.148], nor an interaction
between the two [F(1, 18) = 0.307, p = 0587, η2p = 0.017].
Figure 3C clearly shows that there is no trend toward any reward
priming interaction. In fact, the only trend in the data is a non-
significant negative effect of preceding reward value, the opposite
of reward priming. As in experiment 1, inverse efficiency analysis
did not reveal any effects (F’s < 1, p’s > 0.443).
DISCUSSION
Although we incentivized faster responding, we found no hints
of reward priming in experiment 3. All our efforts to replicate
Hickey et al. in a paradigm conceptually identical to theirs have
failed. The most sensible reason left is that superficial differences
between our paradigm and theirs explain the discrepancy. The
reward priming effect may be specific to tasks with certain minute
attributes. In experiment 4, we tested whether we could pro-
duce reward priming using the original paradigm by Hickey et al.
(2010a,b).
2To correct for the possiblity of unequal variances, we usedWelch’s t-test with
corrected degrees of freedom.
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EXPERIMENT 4—DIRECT REPLICATION OF THE REWARD
PRIMING PARADIGM
In experiment 4, we used the same stimulus set as Hickey et al. but
kept the set-size of 4 and the same instructions as in experiment
1, to try to replicate their reward priming effect.
METHODS
Observers were the same as in experiment 2. The stimuli were
approximate copies of those used by Hickey et al. (2010a).
Targets were defined by shape, rather than spatial frequency
and could be either diamonds or circles. A circular stimu-
lus had a diameter of 4.3◦ while the diamonds were tilted
squares (by 45◦) with sides of 3.7◦ visual angle. The stim-
uli were either red (x = 0.580, z = 0.322) or green (x = 0.296,
z = 0.529) and approximately equiluminant at 31 cd/m2. As
in the original additional distractor reward paradigm (e.g.,
Hickey et al., 2010a), the response feature was a small bar
(0.8◦ long, <0.1◦ wide) at the center of each search stimulus,
but they were tilted by ±45◦, to make the response demands
identical to experiments 1–3 (Figure 4). This is in contrast
to the horizontal/vertical distinction in the original paradigm.
Other aspects of the methods and procedure were identical to
experiment 1.
RESULTS
The data were filtered in the same way as previously. A repeated
measures ANOVA revealed no main effect of color repetition
[F(1, 18) = 1.844, p = 0.191, η2p = 0.093], but showed a main
effect of reward value [F(1, 18) = 5.78, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.243].
Most importantly, for the first time here, there was a marginally
significant interaction between color repetition and reward value
[F(1, 18) = 4.711, p = 0.044, η2p = 0.207] matching the quali-
tative pattern of reward priming (Figure 3D). There is there-
fore a small reward priming effect, dependent on color repe-
tition following high reward trials. However, although there is
a small trend toward an inhibitory effect when colors swapped
following high reward, this was far from significant [t(18) = 0.400,
p = 0.694].
DISCUSSION
In experiment 4, we only partly replicate the results of Hickey
et al. (2010a,b, 2011). Following high reward, search was speeded
if search colors were identical but not if they switched. If the
reward was low there was no effect of the color scheme on the
preceding trial. We are, however, still left with the puzzle that in a
conceptually identical paradigm tested three times (Experiments
1 to 3) this reward priming from non-feature-contingent reward
is not observed. Hickey et al. argue that “reward acts largely to
prime target representations, consistent with the idea that objects
associated with good outcome become visually salient” (2011,
p 117). According to our results this conclusion applies, at best,
to a subset of stimulus types, laying an important constraint
upon the generalizability of reward priming. Reward has a strong
effect on attentional function in various other paradigms, but the
reward schedules in these paradigms were not random as here
(Della-Libera and Chelazzi, 2009; Kiss et al., 2009; Kristjánsson
et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011). Results of future studies
will have to determine how general the non-contingent reward
priming effect is.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN EXPERIMENTS 1 TO 4
There are marked differences in data patterns of individual
observers, and from that point-of-view, any systematic patterns
are hard to discern. Figure 5A shows the variance in priming
effects, mean RTswap-mean RTrepetition in experiment 1 when pre-
vious reward was high. Positive priming effects were observed
for only 12 out of the 20 observers, and in contrast to Hickey
et al. (2010b) most of the observers also show positive prim-
ing effects in the low reward condition (Figure 5B). A similar
pattern, only stronger, appears in experiment 2 (set-size = 8),
where a large majority of observers show positive color prim-
ing effects under both reward conditions (Figures 5C,D). In
FIGURE 3 | Mean reaction times in experiments 1-4, for all observers
by immediately preceding reward and repetition or switch of the
color scheme from the preceding trial. Search arrays show stimuli and
set-sizes in each experiment (not drawn to scale; see Methods for
details). Error bars show within-subject 95% confidence intervals
(Cousineau, 2005).
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experiment 3, observers were approximately equally likely to show
positive and negative priming effects in both reward conditions
(Figures 5E,F). Only in experiment 4, where we used the original
stimulus set (e.g., Hickey et al., 2010a), was there any divergence
of data patterns following high and low reward. Here, 15 out of 19
FIGURE 4 | An illustration of the stimuli used in experiment 4.
Observers were to locate the target with the odd shape (the green
diamond) and report the tilt of the line inside it. The example in the figure
shows a trial with an irrelevant singleton (the red circle). Stimuli are not
drawn to scale (see Method for details).
observers showed positive priming effects following high reward
(Figure 5G), while the effects following low reward were scattered
almost equally around 0 (Figure 5H).
In Table 1 we show correlations between priming effects on
trial n conditional on reward reception on trial n-1 and BIS/BAS
subscale scores (Carver and White, 1994). We were particu-
larly interested in the BASdrive subscale because Hickey et al.
(2010a) found a strong positive correlation between this subscale
and priming effects following highly rewarded trials. BASdrive
measures persistence in achieving a desired goal, i.e., reward
seeking. The BASreward responsiveness subscale is also of interest
since it measures sensitivity to the occurrence or reception of
reward.
Sixteen out of 19 observers in experiments 2 and 4 responded
to the BIS/BAS scale. Two observers chose not to respond, or did
not respond to all items. In experiment 3, 17 out of 20 observers
responded to the full questionnaire. Table 1 shows correlations
between the subscales of the BIS/BAS scale and priming effects
following low and high reward trials. No correlations were sig-
nificant, an unsurprising result with so few respondents, but
three correlations were marginally significant (p < 0.06). It is
interesting to note that, in experiment 4, where we used the
stimulus-set of Hickey et al. (2010a,b), there is no indication
of a relationship between BASdrive and high reward. However,
there are hints of a positive relationship between BASdrive and
low reward reception, i.e., that those more persistent in seek-
ing out positive reward outcomes are more likely to be positively
primed by the low reward-color association. There may also be
relationships between observers’ sensitivity to reward reception
FIGURE 5 | Differences between repeated vs. swapped color
displays (RTswap - RTrepeated) when previous reward was high
(top panels) and low (bottom panels). Each point represents one
observer. The order of observers is maintained within each
experiment. Therefore, a single observer’s priming effects following
high and low reward can be identified by order and data-point
symbols. The symbols have no significance besides easing
within-subject comparisons.
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Table 1 | Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) between subscales of
the BIS/BAS scale and priming effects under high and low reward
conditions.
BIS/BAS subscale
BASdrive BASfun BASreward BIS
Exp 2 (n = 16) low reward 0.014 −0.118 −0.491 −0.423
high reward −0.048 −0.174 −0.167 −0.206
Exp 3 (n = 17) low reward −0.060 −0.346 −0.469 −0.008
high reward −0.079 −0.385 0.001 0.357
Exp 4 (n = 16) low reward 0.487 0.033 0.295 0.023
high reward 0.001 0.011 −0.200 −0.217
No correlations were significant. Highlighted cells indicate marginally significant
p-values (<06).
(BASreward responsiveness). In experiments 2 and 3 there is a nega-
tive correlation (Table 1) between priming effects following low
reward reception and reward responsiveness, i.e., those most pos-
itively affected by reward reception are most likely to devalue a
color, following a co-occurrence with low reward. Notably, the
three strongest correlations are all related to low reward reception.
Note, however that the psychophysical data shows no low-reward
and color associations in any of the 4 experiments (Figure 3),
meaning that these correlations reflect the large between-
subject variances in performance, but not systematic population
effects.
THE CARRIER OF THE REWARD PRIMING EFFECT
A last attempt at explaining the discrepancies between experi-
ments 1–3 and experiment 4 (see also Hickey et al., 2010a,b),
relates to the potential carrier of the reward priming effect. In
visual search, carriers of different effects can change depending
on task-demands and/or minute stimulus attributes. An exam-
ple is the attentional repetition priming effect that, under certain
conditions, is purely feature based (i.e., Kristjánsson, 2006, 2009;
Ásgeirsson et al., 2014) whereas a small change in feature configu-
ration can facilitate object—rather than feature—based priming
(Kristjánsson et al., 2008, see also Ásgeirsson and Kristjánsson,
2011). It is possible that for reward priming, the whole object
must be repeated, i.e., color, spatial frequency and orientation,
and that this might account for the absence of reward priming
in experiments 1 to 3, although this is unlikely in light of the
results of Kristjánsson(2006), (see Kristjánsson and Campana,
2010 for review). After all, the lines to be judged in Hickey et al’s
experiments were not connected to the colored items that either
repeated or changed. We therefore, re-ran our analyses from
experiments 1–3 with an additional filter. Only trials where spa-
tial frequency was repeated (along with earlier filters, see Method,
Experiment 1) were analyzed.
If our paradigm results in reward priming, but objects, rather
than features carry the effect, we should see the qualitative pattern
of Hickey et al. (2010a) if we analyze only trials where a full object
is repeated from the preceding trial. Repeated measures ANOVAs
on data filtered in this new way did not reveal any interactions
between reward and color repetitions (p’s > 0.218), nor any hint
of object-based reward priming at all in experiments 1–3.
CONTROLLING FOR OTHER VARIABLES
Another potential issue that needs addressing is whether the two
different spatial frequencies affect the processing of the stimuli,
and could therefore disguise reward priming effects. In principle,
reward priming could be present for only one category of spatial
frequencies. Therefore, we re-ran the analyses from experiments
1–3 with the addition of spatial frequency as an independent fac-
tor in repeated measures ANOVAs. In all three experiments, we
confirmed main effects of spatial frequency (F’s ranged 17.3–
31.4; p’s < 0.001), where observers responded faster to the low
frequency targets (range: 54–82ms). However, spatial frequency
never interacted with reward (p’s> 0.361), color repetition (p’s>
0.108) or the combination of all three factors (p’s > 0.214). Based
on these analyses, we cannot conclude that the current results
are explained by the difference in defining variable characteristics
(i.e., Spatial frequency).
As mentioned in themethod section for experiment 1, the data
in different publications from Hickey and colleagues is not in all
cases filtered in the same way. In Hickey et al. (2010a), the authors
emphasize that there should be more interference by a single-
ton distractor when it is novel, meaning, in the current context,
that it was not present on the preceding trial. Hitherto, we have
filtered data according to the method described in that publi-
cation. In a later publication, Hickey et al. (2011) reversed this
filter and limited their analyses to trials when a singleton dis-
tractor is present and was present on the previous trial. To make
sure that we were not misrepresenting the comparison between
the current study and those of Hickey et al. (2010a,b, 2011) we
re-analyzed the data with the exact filters described inHickey et al.
(2011). In our four experiments, we did not find a single signif-
icant effect, whether main effects of color priming or previous
rewards or an interaction between the two. The crucial interac-
tion effect that constitutes reward priming had p-values ranging
from.172 in experiment 1 to.799 in experiment 2. Even in exper-
iment 4, where we presented the original stimulus materials of
Hickey et al. (2010a,b, 2011), the effect vanished and the data did
not show any reward priming. This is notable since we partially
replicated the reward priming pattern in our initial analysis, with
the filters based on Hickey et al. (2010a).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Hickey et al. (2010a,b, 2011) reported an intriguing effect of
random reward, where attentional capture by an irrelevant sin-
gleton distractor decreased when the color scheme of the stimuli
remained constant on consecutive trials, an effect they called
reward priming. Conceptually identical paradigms tested here
show that this effect is far from reliable—not generalizing well to
other comparable situations. We do, however, partially replicate
their result pattern in experiment 4 using their exact stimulus set,
and a particular data filter. Hickey et al claimed that their findings
reflected that primed features becomemore salient. This is consis-
tent with what others have claimed for reward (e.g., Kristjánsson
et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011). But the important difference
here is that the rewards were not consistently related to a partic-
ular feature. In spite of the difficulties in replicating the reward
priming effects using a different stimulus set, we acknowledge
that it has been observed on three separate occasions (Hickey
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et al., 2010a,b, 2011), but our results cast doubt upon the simple
salience-enhancement account of the effect. Why wouldn’t the
feature “green” become more salient, following reception of high
reward, when presented as part of a Gabor-patch, when it does
so as part of a circle or diamond shape? We have ruled out any
role of set-size (experiment 2) and, at least, partially replicated
the effect with a set-size of 4 (experiment 4). We have also shown
that reward priming does not depend on whole-object processing
and that our failures to replicate the effect in experiments 1 and 2
are unlikely to reflect insufficient motivation.
The discrepancy may potentially be explained by different task
demands in the Gabor-patch version of the additional singleton
paradigm, compared to the original. Might 1-trial reward prim-
ing depend on fast deployment of focal attention? Hickey and van
Zoest (2012) showed that trajectories of saccadic eye-movements
are strongly affected by the value of random reward on a pre-
ceding trial, and saccadic latencies. When latencies were short,
performance was comparable to the visual search tasks revealing
reward priming. Following high reward and a color swap between
a target and a distractor, saccadic trajectories were “pulled”
toward the distractor. Conversely, when previous reward was low
and the color scheme was repeated, trajectories were repulsed
away from the distractor. For long latencies, however, there was
a repulsion effect for all conditions, as if the observers actively
avoided the “pull” of the distractor. There may be an important
difference in the deployment of attention in experiments 1–3 and
experiment 4 here, in that to judge Gabor-patch orientation, focal
processing may not be necessary, while in experiment 4, observers
must focus on the target to discern the orientation of the cen-
tral bar. A question for the future is therefore whether the reward
priming effect is tied to the deployment of focal attention and,
consequently, planning of saccades (although these may not nec-
essarily be executed). Such an account is more nuanced than a
simple salience enhancement account and a fully fleshed out ver-
sion is beyond the scope of this article, but deserves attention in
future.
For now, the most obvious conclusion to draw from our
results, however, has to be that reward-color contingencies should
be more consistent than here for reliable effects of reward upon
attentional function. Kristjánsson et al. (2010) showed how the
influence of reward, despite being flexible, builds up over time. It
is therefore not unreasonable to expect that contingency between
color and reward would induce stronger effects. It is, of course,
difficult to define what a contingent relationship between reward
and a feature really means in such a context. Even if stim-
uli are presented in random colors, the visual system probably
regards coincidental sequences of repeated reward-color associ-
ations as something systematic. There must be a first instance of
every possible association and, in that regard; a random presen-
tation of reward and color is just a normal sequence of many
such instances. It is unfortunate that the reward priming effect
seems contingent on various co-occurrences (see the description
of Data filtering in Experiment 1). Meaningful analysis of longer
sequences, say up 3-trials back, therefore requires large amounts
of data. It may be necessary to design experiments that bypass
this problem to get a fuller picture of reward priming and how it
develops over adjacent trials.
Another aspect of the design used by Hickey et al., which
may merit further attention, is that while the main measure is
response time, speed in responding is not the optimal task strat-
egy. Motivating observers to respond quickly by limiting the time
that they had for earning reward, did not affect the results how-
ever. This null-finding from one-experiment is of course far from
being conclusive and the relationship of reward and strategy
clearly merits further investigation (Shen and Chun, 2010; Della
Libera et al., 2011). Della Libera et al. (2011) have argued for two
separate reward-learning mechanisms in attention, one involving
active monitoring of the contingencies, the other reflecting pas-
sive associations between reward and contingent stimuli (see also
Camara et al., 2013). Clearly, only one of those can be operative
under random reward schedules. Of great interest for future stud-
ies may be to uncover the conditions determining the operation
of the two mechanisms.
CONCLUSIONS
In sum, we are forced to the conclusion that reward priming is
not a particularly robust effect, and cannot be fully accounted
for by enhanced salience of rewarded features. Further stud-
ies will need to identify the boundary conditions of reward
priming.
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